Gandhi" (p. 173). Chapter 7 argues that since the end of the cold war, utopianism has become more fashionable, finding expression not only in writing but also in new media (including Facebook) and in well-funded technological projects. Segal notes how "scientific and technological pioneers avowedly link their achievements with the recovery of human divinity" as they seek to "transcend earthly boundaries through space flight and to exercise God-like powers of artificial intelligence and genetic engineering" (p. 187). Given these ambitions, it seems that history can "be ignored, so profoundly different will the future be from the past" (p. 188), a proposition Segal carefully refutes.
This overview contains sections that cry out for expansion had this not been a survey. For example, Segal makes an interesting but all too brief critique of Leo Marx's 1964 Machine in the Garden (p. 84) that seems debatable. Such passages should be seen as springboards to class discussion, for this book seems ideally suited to a course on the history of utopias, and it deserves wide adoption for that purpose. As Segal makes abundantly clear, utopia in all its forms is flourishing, from experiments like "second life" in cyberspace (pp. 198-99) to the escapist fantasies of science fiction films (pp. 199-203) to the "edutopian" embrace of "teaching machines" (pp. 203-17) . He demonstrates that utopias still matter, that technologies are deeply embedded within them, and that they urgently demand critical discussion. This book is an excellent place to begin. With the passing of sociologist Ulrich Beck in January 2015, we lost one of our most prolific and versatile scholars of the dynamics of modernity. Beck was catapulted to instant notoriety with the appearance in 1986 of his Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. In this book he developed the idea that modernity was being superseded by a new social formation based on efforts to define and manage the unintended consequences of modernization itself. This idea of "reflexive modernization," aka the "modernization of modernity," soon engaged social theorists of the caliber of Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash in an extended collaboration. "Risk" was in the air. Two years prior to Beck's 1986 debut, Yale sociologist Charles Perrow published his highly influential Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies. Though the argument seems strikingly similar, there are clear differences in the way each conceives the etiology of risk and how they connect it to grander themes like modernity. For Perrow, risks were primarily a product of organizational and technological complexity and he provided hair-raising, fine-grained accounts to prove the point. Beck argued that risks were the product of inevitable unintended consequences: the modernistic project itself produced unintended risks that manifested themselves as a kind of second-order modernistic challenge and so transformed the very nature of modernity itself. As a grand social theorist in the tradition of Max Weber and Karl Marx, Beck went on to explore the ramifications of this "second modernity" across a wide range of domains, from climate change and equality to the dynamics of intimate relationships and migration. In his final years he developed a discourse of "cosmopolitization," arguing that many risks had gone global-or at least transnationaland that the nation-state was rapidly becoming an obsolete scale of governance for tackling the new scale of risks. Instead, new "cosmopolitan" arrangements, based on bridging but not annihilating differences, would now have to shape the agenda of the "second modernity."
The present volume is an edited version of a symposium held in honor of Ulrich Beck in July 2009 at the Ludwig Maximilian University in Munich, where Beck taught for many years. Participants included luminaries such as Zygmunt Bauman, Bruno Latour, Wolf Lepenies, Elisabeth BeckGernsheim, and of course Ulrich Beck himself. It is hardly surprising that the members of this illustrious company, though clearly allowing themselves to be inspired by Beck's work, also very much seized on the occasion to fry their own fish. The five(!) editors here did what they could to organize the texts into what-all things considered-turns out to be a surprisingly coherent book. Their brief introduction showcases the issues raised in the symposium and they provide additional footholds by grouping the texts into four thematic headings: Cosmopolitanizing European Modernity, World Risk Society-Climate Change in a Cosmopolitical View, Inequality and Governance in the Global Age, and Individualization Cosmopolitanized. These rubrics reflect the scope of Beck's more recent concerns. All readers will find something to instruct and inspire them in the book, though it is unlikely they will find all the contributions equally entrancing.
Why should historians of technology want to read this book or, by extension, participate in this kind of grand sociopolitical discourse? For one thing, this symposium once again reveals the technological and historical deficit endemic in grand social theory. Technologies are clearly everywhere, but by and large banished to the basement and the wings and when they are opportunistically brought onstage, it is only as an ahistorical deus ex machina. As method and body of knowledge, history of technology can certainly help to overcome these conceptual and empirical deficits, but only if historians of technology take the initiative. For a start, see another debate with Beck held at the Rachel Carson Center: www.environmentandsociety.org/sites/default/files/2011_6_risk_society.pdf. For another thing, in the long run history of technology can save itself from chronic societal irrelevance only by allowing the "big picture" to inform its conceptualizations and research agendas. Risk, cosmopolitization, and the fate of modernity are gateways par excellence into these heady realms. Islands, by their nature, have special problems communicating with the rest of the world. All of them, except Great Britain, are beholden to outside powers for their international communications. Cuba's size, economic importance, and strategic location in the Caribbean increase both its need to communicate and its dependence on other nations. This book, by a distinguished Cuban historian, describes the technologies of Cuba's external communications and its vulnerability to foreign interests.
NIL DISCO
From 1492 to 1867, communications with the outside world went solely by ship. Starting in 1664, regular mail ships linked Cuba with Mexico and Spain. After American independence, Thomas Jefferson and John Quincy Adams advocated annexing Cuba, sparking a rivalry between the United States and Spain for control of the island. In the early nineteenth century, as Cuba's external trade grew, regular sailings linked the island to the United States and to Great Britain.
In the 1850s, a new technology-submarine telegraph cables-aroused a great deal of interest. Proposals for a cable linking Havana to the United States via Key West promised to stimulate trade, but also whetted the American eagerness to annex Cuba. In 1866, an American firm obtained the concession for a cable to Cuba. The opening of telegraphic communication coincided with the first Cuban war for independence from Spain. The revolt failed but the cable business thrived, and new cables were laid between Cuba and other Caribbean islands and to South America. During the Spanish American War of 1898, the U.S. Navy attempted but failed to sever Cuba's communications with Spain. Victory in that lopsided conflict gave the United States control over Cuba's internal affairs and possession of the Guantanamo naval base.
The invention of wireless telegraphy led to a rivalry between Cubans
